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is a great institutional danger, especially 
in the military profession, where free 
thinking, combined with robust debate, 
is the essential prerequisite for not being 
out thought and outfought by future foes�
Almost as dangerous as intellectual 
thuggery is willful ignorance of “un-
pleasant truths” or empirical evidence� 
This was illustrated most notoriously 
by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’s 
recent a priori policy decision, made 
in the fashion of Alice in Wonderland’s 
Red Queen (“Sentence first, verdict 
afterwards!”), to open all ground combat 
positions to women regardless of any 
data that might result subsequently 
from the Marine Corps’s rigorous 
yearlong study regarding the perfor-
mance of mixed-gender units� That 
sort of thing corrosively undermines 
the institutional trust essential to the 
success of any military organization�
Pussycats doubtless is controversial� 
However, van Creveld’s arguments are 
coherent and intellectually substantive, 
even if one may disagree with some of 
the assumptions he makes to support 
them� Because they explicitly address 
the most fundamental criterion for 
assessing military forces—their combat 
effectiveness—they are very worth 
pondering by serving military officers 
and civilian policy makers, especially 
those more senior� Certainly the ques-
tion of why Western military might, in 
conjunction with the other elements 
of state power, has not been more 
effective during the past half-century 
is a crucial one, given the multiple 
dangerous challenges the West confronts 
both today and over the longer term�
JAN VAN TOL
Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological In-
novation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Im-
plications, by Sarah Kirchberger� Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 2015� 318 pages� $129�
Few recent works on the Chinese navy 
have arrived with a more intrigu-
ing pedigree than this volume� It is 
unusual to find any in-depth work on 
the Chinese military being done by 
European researchers� Assessing China’s 
Naval Power, the product of a German 
academic and released by a respected 
European publisher, is essentially unique 
in the field� Further, the author comes 
at the problem with a diverse résumé, 
having applied her academic training 
in East Asian politics as an analyst with 
the German shipbuilder Blohm + Voss� 
Despite these selling points, the work 
fails to deliver an original or compelling 
view of the fast-changing Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)�
Dr� Kirchberger sets out to create 
an objective and largely materialist 
yardstick by which to measure Chinese 
naval development� While dealing 
briefly with issues of policy and strategy, 
she notes that matériel “defines the up-
per limit of what is achievable through 
naval strategy�” As she seeks objective 
comparisons, Kirchberger uses other 
Asian and the so-called BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) navies as the 
benchmark for “normal” naval develop-
ment� While interesting, this effort to 
quantify the analysis results in a strained 
attempt to extract meaning from what 
is quantifiable from available sources�
As an example, in one vignette Kirch-
berger compares Asian naval forces 
with the total areas of the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) their nations 
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claim� The result suggests that China has 
an average level of patrol-capable vessels, 
but that the PLAN submarine force, at 
one submarine per 35,716�75 square 
kilometers of EEZ, is comparatively 
large� It is tempting to critique such an 
approach on the details: the figure used 
for China’s EEZ is smaller than the scope 
of its expansive maritime claims; and 
administration of maritime claims in 
China is a function of its rapidly growing 
coast guard and maritime militia (not 
explicitly included), whereas for many 
of the other nations analyzed the navy 
performs law-enforcement functions� 
More significant is the irrelevance of the 
figures themselves� By that yardstick, 
the U�S� Navy (not included in this 
analysis) defends one of the world’s 
largest EEZs with a paltry one subma-
rine per 210,000 square kilometers of 
EEZ� Navies are developed for strategic 
purposes, which vary from case to case�
Additionally, the focus on comparing 
the PLAN with developing nations’ 
navies ignores the fact that one of the 
driving combat tasks for the PLAN 
is countering USN presence in Asia� 
Taking the U�S� Navy as a yardstick for 
Chinese naval development matters 
because it is the yardstick the Chinese 
themselves have set� That does not mean 
the PLAN needs or desires to emulate 
USN force structure in detail, but 
considering both sides of a two-sided 
interaction is critical to understanding�
More interesting is Kirchberger’s analysis 
of China’s shipbuilding capabilities� 
Drawing on her experience in the 
shipbuilding industry, Kirchberger 
assesses that the Chinese civil shipbuild-
ing industry, though massive, offers few 
advantages in the production of naval 
combatants� In the critical maritime 
electronic sector, the book argues 
that the European arms embargo and 
centralized Chinese state control have 
stymied most meaningful innovation� 
Chinese combatants are presented as 
collections of imported and copied 
systems, with the assumption that the 
systems-integration problems such a 
model implies significantly hamper 
their combat performance� The Chinese 
decision to purchase the Russian-made 
Sovremenny-class destroyer and 
Kilo-class submarine in the middle of 
the previous decade is seen as a tacit 
admission of systemic deficiencies in 
Chinese maritime systems develop-
ment� However, Kirchberger arguably 
underestimates China’s success at both 
systems integration and adaptation 
of foreign technologies� For example, 
China received limited numbers of 
Russian-manufactured MINERAL 
ME radars and reverse engineered 
them with enough success that they 
now are deployed on every Jiangkai 
II frigate produced� Kirchberger 
dismisses these systems as poor copies�
While an earnest effort, at its heart this 
volume fails on its sources� Dependent 
on other secondary, primarily English-
language, works, it contains few if any 
references to Chinese-language sources� 
As the volume was published in 2015, 
most of these sources are from 2013 
and prior� For example, Kirchberger’s 
most consequential conclusions about 
the PLAN submarine force hinge on a 
2007 analysis of PLAN patrol activity 
during the prior decade� The result 
is a view of the Chinese navy that 
arguably is accurate as of about 2010, 
but that does not account for the rapid 
changes in the scope and complexity 
of PLAN platforms, capabilities, and 
operations in the intervening years�
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Given the relatively small number of 
academics doing serious analysis of the 
PLAN, the introduction of a new point 
of view is always to be welcomed. In 
this case, however, naval professionals 
interested in Chinese naval development 
would be served better by going directly 
to the sources behind this volume.
DALE C. RIELAGE
Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Con-
flict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991, by 
Xiaoming Zhang. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North 
Carolina Press, 2015. 296 pages. $34.95 (e-book 
$33.99).
This book will be welcomed equally 
by historians, political scientists, and 
international relations specialists. It is 
a worthy addition to existing literature 
and belongs on any bookshelf dedicated 
to understanding modern China and 
Southeast Asia. Xiaoming Zhang, an 
associate professor in the Department 
of Strategy at the Air War College, has 
provided valuable additional informa-
tion and analysis concerning the People’s 
Republic of China’s invasion of Vietnam 
in 1979. The Chinese invasion was 
planned deliberately and analytically, 
then for nearly a month the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) fought fiercely 
against China’s neighbor and former 
ally. At the end of this period, the two 
countries settled into a continuing active 
and deadly border dispute that lasted 
a decade. Taking advantage of recently 
declassified Chinese documents and an 
impressive number of interviews, Dr. 
Zhang has advanced significantly our 
understanding of why the Chinese chose 
to initiate the somewhat Orwellian-
sounding “counterattack in self-defense 
against Vietnam,” how the war was 
conducted, and why the subsequent 
conflict along the Vietnamese-
Chinese border lasted so long.
As the history of the conflict unfolds, 
Deng Xiaoping becomes more and 
more the central figure and key Chinese 
decision maker. By the conclusion of the 
book, Dr. Zhang presents a convincing 
case that the war of 1979 was indeed 
Deng’s war—a war into which he entered 
as much to preserve and promote his 
plans for economic modernization as to 
affect the balance of power in the inter-
national political system, while simulta-
neously aiming to rehabilitate and start 
the process of modernizing the PLA.
The book explains how the recent North 
Vietnamese victory over the Americans 
and the South Vietnamese had a surpris-
ingly deleterious effect on Vietnam’s 
previously amiable and long-term alli-
ance with China. Flushed with victory 
and boasting a hardened and well-
equipped army, the Vietnamese became, 
to Chinese eyes, increasingly arrogant 
and unfriendly. Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia and its deepening friendship 
with the Soviet Union led Deng to see 
China’s position as potentially imperiled, 
threatened by the USSR to the north 
and the Vietnamese to the south. In 
particular, the invasion of Cambodia 
in December 1978 was viewed as proof 
of Hanoi’s ambition to make Vietnam a 
hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, and 
added significantly to Deng’s concerns.
Deng, who already had determined that 
economic and industrial modernization 
was the way ahead for China, arrived 
at an apparently counterintuitive 
conclusion. Significant combat opera-
tions conducted against Vietnam, the 
Soviet Union’s most important regional 
ally, would signal to the United States 
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